Drop Dead, Colombia
Democratic Speaker Nancy Pelosi blocks a trade deal with America's closest South American ally.

Thursday, April 10, 2008; Page A22

THE YEAR 2008 may enter history as the time when the Democratic Party lost its way on trade. Already, the party's presidential candidates have engaged in an unseemly contest to adopt the most protectionist posture, suggesting that, if elected, they might pull out of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Yesterday, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi declared her intention to change the procedural rules governing the proposed trade promotion agreement with Colombia. President Bush submitted the pact to Congress on Tuesday for a vote within the next 90 legislative days, as required by the "fast-track" authority under which the U.S. negotiated the deal with Colombia. Ms. Pelosi says she'll ask the House to undo that rule.

The likely result is no vote on the agreement this year. Ms. Pelosi denies that her intent is to kill the bill, insisting yesterday that Congress simply needs more time to consider it "in light of the economic uncertainty in our country." She claimed that she feared that, "if brought to the floor immediately, [the pact] would lose. And what message would that send?" But Ms. Pelosi's decision-making process also included a fair component of pure Washington pique: She accused Mr. Bush of "usurp[ing] the discretion of the speaker of the House" to schedule legislation.

That political turf-staking, and the Democrats' decreasingly credible claims of a death-squad campaign against Colombia's trade unionists, constitutes all that's left of the case against the agreement. Economically, it should be a no-brainer -- especially at a time of rising U.S. joblessness. At the moment, Colombian exports to the United States already enjoy preferences. The trade agreement would make those permanent, but it would also give U.S. firms free access to Colombia for the first time, thus creating U.S. jobs. Politically, too, the agreement is in the American interest, as a reward to a friendly, democratic government that has made tremendous strides on human rights, despite harassment from Venezuela's Hugo Chávez.
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To be sure, President Bush provoked Ms. Pelosi. But he forced the issue only after months of inconclusive dickering convinced him that Democrats were determined to avoid a vote that would force them to accept accountability for opposing an agreement that is manifestly in America's interest. It turns out his suspicions were correct.

"I take this action with deep respect to the people of Colombia and will be sure that any message they receive is one of respect for their country, and the importance of the friendship between our two countries," Ms. Pelosi protested yesterday. Perhaps Colombia's government and people will understand. We don't.

The war behind the insults

Latin America
Mar 6th 2008
From The Economist print edition

The real enemy is the FARC guerrilla group and its Venezuelan supporter, not Colombia

THIS week it has seemed to the casual eye as if northern South America were on the brink of war. It began when Colombian forces bombed a camp just inside Ecuador, killing 21 FARC guerrillas including Raúl Reyes, a top commander. Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, chose to treat this as a casus belli. He broke off diplomatic relations and ordered troops to the border, warning Álvaro Uribe, Colombia's president, not to try anything similar against Venezuela. Ecuador's Rafael Correa, cautious at first, felt obliged to mimic his fellow leftist, breaking ties and moving troops up to his border.

So far the three leaders have fired nothing deadlier than epithets (“genocidal”, “liar” and “lackey” were the small arms of this verbal battle). Yet this is the most serious diplomatic conflict in South America for more than a decade. Political brinkmanship could easily tip over into shooting.

Its root cause is the FARC, a guerrilla army founded in the 1960s whose anachronistic Marxist language conceals its degeneration into a predatory mafia of kidnappers and drug traffickers. In the 1990s it came close to making Colombia ungovernable. Then three years of talks—during which the FARC kidnapped many of the hostages who now constitute its main weapon—showed that it had no interest in peace or democracy. Colombia's elected leaders turned to the United States for military aid to match the cash that American drug consumers were giving the FARC and other mafia armies.

Thanks to this aid and its own defence build-up, Mr Uribe's government has reduced the FARC, driving it deep into Colombia's jungles. But as long as the FARC's seven-man leadership remained at large, several of them apparently in camps across the borders, the guerrillas could claim to be winning—and so they have rejected genuine peace talks. That was why Mr Uribe authorised the bombing raid that killed Mr Reyes.

Was he right to do so? One objection is that Mr Reyes was involved in talks to free FARC hostages, including Ingrid Betancourt, a Colombian who also holds French nationality. But weakening the FARC is more likely to free more captives (including Ms Betancourt). A second complaint is weightier: Colombia should have sought Mr Correa's consent before acting. But would the Ecuadoreans have tipped off the FARC? Colombia claims to have recovered Mr Reyes's laptops and says their contents point to connivance (see article).

The Organisation of American States criticised Colombia, but did not condemn it outright as Ecuador wanted. Certainly Colombia should make a full apology. But in return it deserves greater co-operation from its neighbours. In a democratic South America there is no place for the FARC. But Mr Uribe has been better at security policy than at diplomacy. If some governments mistakenly see him merely as George Bush's proxy in their backyard, that is mainly because Colombia has failed to win wider sympathy for its beleaguered democracy.

Danger: one imploding Venezuelan
The biggest threat in the region is not Colombia but Venezuela. Mr Chávez has recently veered towards outright support for the FARC. Colombia alleges that the captured laptops show that he gave the guerrillas $300m (and also that the FARC is seeking uranium for a “dirty” bomb). Mr Chávez's mismanagement of Venezuela's oil boom has made him increasingly unpopular at home. His regime runs a risk of imploding. A cornered Mr Chávez might think of a border skirmish as the perfect distraction—and as justification for more repression at home. Even as they scold Mr Uribe, Brazil and other South American countries should warn Venezuela that it is destabilising the continent—and it is high time it stopped.
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10808543

Revealed: Chávez role in cocaine trail to Europe
Sunday February 3, 2008
The Observer

The guerrilla group Farc has long been suspected of running the Colombian cocaine industry. But how does it move the drug so readily out of the country? In a special investigation, John Carlin in Venezuela reports on the remarkable collusion between Colombia's rebels and its neighbour's armed forces.

Some fighters desert from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) because they feel betrayed by the leadership, demoralised by a sense that the socialist ideals that first informed the guerrilla group have been replaced by the savage capitalism of drug trafficking. Others leave to be with their families. Still others leave because they begin to think that, if they do not, they will die. Such is the case of Rafael, who deserted last September after 18 months operating in a Farc base inside Venezuela, with which Colombia shares a long border.

The logic of Rafael's decision seems, at first, perverse. He is back in Colombia today where, as a guerrilla deserter, he will live for the rest of his days under permanent threat of assassination by his former comrades. Venezuela, on the other hand, ought to have been a safe place to be a Farc guerrilla. President Hugo Chávez has publicly given Farc his political support and the Colombian army seems unlikely to succumb to the temptation to cross the border in violation of international law.
'All this is true,' says Rafael. 'The Colombian army doesn't cross the border and the guerrillas have a non-aggression pact with the Venezuelan military. The Venezuelan government lets Farc operate freely because they share the same left-wing, Bolivarian ideals, and because Farc bribes their people.'
Then what did he run away from? 'From a greater risk than the one I run now: from the daily battles with other guerrilla groups to see who controls the cocaine-trafficking routes. There is a lot of money at stake in control of the border where the drugs come in from Colombia. The safest route to transport cocaine to Europe is via Venezuela.'
Rafael is one of 2,400 guerrillas who deserted Farc last year. He is one of four I spoke to, all of whom had grown despondent about a purportedly left-wing revolutionary movement whose power and influence rests less on its political legitimacy and more on the benefits of having become the world's biggest kidnapping organisation and the world's leading traffickers in cocaine.
Farc has come a long way from its leftist revolutionary roots and is now commonly referred to in Colombia and elsewhere as 'narco-guerrillas'. Pushed out to the border areas, it has been rendered increasingly irrelevant politically and militarily due to the combined efforts of Colombia's centre-right President, Alvaro Uribe, and his principal backers, the United States, whose Plan Colombia, devised under the presidency of Bill Clinton, has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the Colombian military and police. A large part of Plan Colombia is designed to eradicate the vast coca plantations cultivated and maintained by Farc and other Colombian groups.
However, the impact on Farc has been ambiguous: its chances of launching a left-wing insurrection in the manner of Nicaragua's Sandinistas in 1979 are nil, but then they probably always were; yet it looks capable of surviving indefinitely as an armed force as a result of the income from its kidnapping, extortion and cocaine interests.
Helping it to survive, and prosper, is its friend and neighbour Hugo Chávez. The Venezuelan President sought to extract some international credit from the role he played as mediator in the release last month in Venezuelan territory of two kidnapped women, friends of Ingrid Betancourt, a French citizen and former Colombian presidential candidate held by Farc for six years. But Chávez has not denounced Farc for holding Betancourt and 43 other 'political' hostages.
I spoke at length to Rafael (not his real name) and three other Farc deserters about the links between the guerrilla group and Chávez's Venezuela, in particular their co-operation in the drug business. All four have handed themselves in to the Colombian government in recent months under an official programme to help former guerrillas adapt back to civilian life.
I also spoke to high-level security, intelligence and diplomatic sources from five countries, some of them face to face in Colombia and London, some of them by phone. All of them insisted on speaking off the record, either for political or safety reasons, both of which converge in Farc, the oldest functioning guerrilla organisation in the world and one that is richer, more numerous and better armed than any other single Colombian drug cartel and is classified as 'terrorist' by the European Union and the US.
All the sources I reached agreed that powerful elements within the Venezuelan state apparatus have forged a strong working relationship with Farc. They told me that Farc and Venezuelan state officials operated actively together on the ground, where military and drug-trafficking activities coincide. But the relationship becomes more passive, they said, less actively involved, the higher up the Venezuelan government you go. No source I spoke to accused Chávez himself of having a direct role in Colombia's giant drug-trafficking business. Yet the same people I interviewed struggled to believe that Chávez was not aware of the collusion between his armed forces and the leadership of Farc, as they also found it difficult to imagine that he has no knowledge of the degree to which Farc is involved in the cocaine trade.
I made various attempts to extract an official response to these allegations from the Venezuelan government. In the end Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro made a public pronouncement in Uruguay in which he said, without addressing the substance of the allegations, that they were part of a 'racist' and 'colonialist' campaign against Venezuela by the centre-left Spanish newspaper El País, where I originally wrote about Farc and the Venezuelan connection.
What no one disputes, however, is that Chávez is a political ally of Farc (last month he called on the EU and US to stop labelling its members 'terrorists') or that for many years Farc has used Venezuelan territory as a refuge. A less uncontroversial claim, made by all the sources to whom I spoke (the four disaffected guerrillas included), is that if it were not for cocaine, the fuel that feeds the Colombian war, Farc would long ago have disbanded.
The varied testimonies I have heard reveal that the co-operation between Venezuela and the guerrillas in transporting cocaine by land, air and sea is both extensive and systematic. Venezuela is also supplying arms to the guerrillas, offering them the protection of their armed forces in the field, and providing them with legal immunity de facto as they go about their giant illegal business.
Thirty per cent of the 600 tons of cocaine smuggled from Colombia each year goes through Venezuela. Most of that 30 per cent ends up in Europe, with Spain and Portugal being the principal ports of entry. The drug's value on European streets is some £7.5bn a year.
The infrastructure that Venezuela provides for the cocaine business has expanded dramatically over the past five years of Chávez's presidency, according to intelligence sources. Chávez's decision to expel the US Drug Enforcement Administration from his country in 2005 was celebrated both by Farc and drug lords in the conventional cartels with whom they sometimes work. According to Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante, a Colombian kingpin caught by the police last February, 'Venezuela is the temple of drug trafficking.'
A European diplomat with many years of experience in Latin America echoed this view. 'The so-called anti-imperialist, socialist and Bolivarian nation that Chávez says he wants to create is en route to becoming a narco-state in the same way that Farc members have turned themselves into narco-guerrillas. Perhaps Chávez does not realise it but, unchecked, this phenomenon will corrode Venezuela like a cancer.'
The deserters I interviewed said that not only did the Venezuelan authorities provide armed protection to at least four permanent guerrilla camps inside their country, they turned a blind eye to bomb-making factories and bomber training programmes going on inside Farc camps. Rafael - tall and lithe, with the sculptured facial features of the classic Latin American 'guerrillero' - said he was trained in Venezuela to participate in a series of bomb attacks in Bogotá, Colombia's capital.
Co-operation between the Colombian guerrillas and the Venezuelan government extended, Rafael said, to the sale of arms by Chávez's military to Farc; to the supply of Venezuelan ID cards to regular guerrilla fighters and of Venezuelan passports to the guerrilla leaders so they were able to travel to Cuba and Europe; and also to a reciprocal understanding whereby Farc gave military training to the Bolivarian Forces of Liberation, a peculiar paramilitary group created by the Chávez government purportedly for the purpose of defending the motherland in case of American invasion.
Chávez's contacts with Farc are conducted via one of the members of the organisation's leadership, Iván Márquez, who also has a farm in Venezuela and who communicates with the President via senior officials of the Venezuelan intelligence service. As a Farc deserter who had filled a senior position in the propaganda department said: 'Farc shares three basic Bolivarian principles with Chávez: Latin American unity; the anti-imperialist struggle; and national sovereignty. These ideological positions lead them to converge on the tactical terrain.'
The tactical benefits of this Bolivarian (after the 19th-century Latin American liberator, Simón Bolívar) solidarity reach their maximum expression in the multinational cocaine industry. Different methods exist to transport the drug from Colombia to Europe, but what they all have in common is the participation, by omission or commission, of the Venezuelan authorities.
The most direct route is the aerial one. Small planes take off from remote jungle strips in Colombia and land in Venezuelan airfields. Then there are two options, according to intelligence sources. Either the same light planes continue on to Haiti or the Dominican Republic (the US government says that since 2006 its radar network has detected an increase from three to 15 in the number of 'suspicious flights' a week out of Venezuela); or the cocaine is loaded on to large planes that fly directly to countries in West Africa such as Guinea-Bissau or Ghana, from where it continues by sea to Portugal or the north-western Spanish province of Galicia, the entry points to the EU Schengen zone.
A less cumbersome traditional method for getting the drugs to Europe in small quantities is via passengers on international commercial flights - 'mules', as they call them in Colombia. One of the guerrilla deserters I spoke to, Marcelo, said he had taken part in 'eight or nine' missions of this type over 12 months. 'Operating inside Venezuela is the easiest thing in the world,' he said. 'Farc guerrillas are in there completely and the National Guard, the army and other Venezuelans in official positions offer them their services, in exchange for money. There are never shoot-outs between Farc and the guardia or army.'
Rafael said he took part in operations on a bigger scale, their final objective being to transport the cocaine by sea from Venezuelan ports on the Caribbean Sea. His rank in Farc was higher than Marcelo's and he had access to more confidential information. 'You receive the merchandise on the border, brought in by lorry,' he said. 'When the vehicle arrives the National Guard is waiting, already alerted to the fact that it was on its way. They have already been paid a bribe up front, so that the lorry can cross into Venezuela without problems.
'Sometimes they provide us with an escort for the next phase, which involves me and other comrades getting on to the lorry, or into a car that will drive along with it. We then make the 16-hour trip to Puerto Cabello, which is on the coast, west of Caracas. There the lorry is driven into a big warehouse controlled jointly by Venezuelan locals and by Farc, which is in charge of security. Members of the Venezuelan navy take care of customs matters and the safe departure of the vessels. They are alive to all that is going on and they facilitate everything Farc does.'
Rafael described a similar routine with drug operations involving the port of Maracaibo which, according to police sources, is 'a kind of paradise' for drug traffickers. Among whom - until last week when he was gunned down by a rival cartel in a Venezuelan town near the Colombian border - was one of the 'capos' most wanted internationally, a Colombian called Wilber Varela, but better known as 'Jabón', which means 'soap'. 'Varela and others like him set themselves up in stunning homes and buy bankrupt businesses and large tracts of land, converting themselves almost overnight into personages of great value to the local economy,' a police source said. 'Venezuela offers a perfect life insurance scheme for these criminals.'
This 'tactical' convergence between the Venezuelan armed forces and Farc extends to the military terrain. To the point that, according to one especially high-placed intelligence source I spoke to, the National Guard has control posts placed around the guerrilla camps. What for? 'To give them protection, which tells us that knowledge of the tight links between the soldiers on the ground and Farc reaches up to the highest decision-making levels of the Venezuelan military.'
Rafael told how he had travelled once by car with Captain Pedro Mendoza of the National Guard to a military base outside Caracas called Fuerte Tiuna. He entered with the captain, who handed him eight rifles. They then returned to the border with the rifles in the boot of the car.
Rafael said that members of the National Guard also supplied Farc with hand grenades, grenade-launchers and explosive material for bombs made out of a petrol-based substance called C-4.
An intelligence source confirmed that these small movements of arms occurred on a large scale. 'What we see is the drugs going from Colombia to Venezuela and the arms from Venezuela to Colombia. The arms move in a small but constant flow: 5,000 bullets, six rifles. It's very hard to detect because there are lots of small networks, very well co-ordinated, all of them by specialists in Farc.'
Rafael worked directly with these specialists, both in the arms and the drugs business, until he decided the time had come to change his life. 'In June and July I had received courses in making bombs alongside elements of Chávez's militias, the FBL. We learnt, there in a camp in Venezuela, how to put together different types of landmines and how to make bombs. They also taught us how to detonate bombs in a controlled fashion using mobile phones.'
They were training him, he said, for a mission in Bogotá. 'They gave us photos of our targets. We were going to work alongside two Farc groups based in the capital. The plan was to set off bombs, but as the date dawned I began to reflect that I could not continue this way. First, because of the danger from the military engagements we had with the ELN [another formerly left-wing guerrilla group] on the border over control of the drug routes and, second, because it now seemed to me there was a very real risk of getting caught and I believed I had already spent enough years in jail for the Farc cause. It was also highly possible that the security forces in Bogotá would kill me. That was why at the end of August I ran away and in September I handed myself in.'
A European diplomat who is well informed on the drug-trafficking business generally, and who is familiar with Rafael's allegations, made a comparison between the activities of Farc in Venezuela and hypothetically similar activities involving Eta in Spain.
'Imagine if Eta had a bomb-making school in Portugal inside camps protected by the Portuguese police, and that they planned to set off these bombs in Madrid; imagine that the Portuguese authorities furnished Eta with weapons in exchange for money obtained from the sales of drugs, in which the Portuguese authorities were also involved up to their necks: it would be a scandal of enormous proportions. Well, that, on a very big scale, is what the Venezuelan government is allowing to happen right now.'
'The truth,' one senior police source said, 'is that if Venezuela were to make a minimal effort to collaborate with the international community the difference it would make would be huge. We could easily capture two tons of cocaine a month more if they were just to turn up their police work one notch. They don't do it because the place is so corrupt but also, and this is the core reason, because of this "anti-imperialist" stand they take. "If this screws the imperialists," they think, "then how can we possibly help them?" The key to it all is a question of political will. And they don't have any.'
A similar logic applies, according to the highest-placed intelligence source I interviewed, regarding Farc's other speciality, kidnappings. 'If Hugo Chávez wanted it, he could force Farc to free Ingrid Betancourt tomorrow morning. He tells Farc: "You hand her over or it's game over in Venezuela for you." The dependence of Farc on the Venezuelans is so enormous that they could not afford to say no.'
A nation at war
· Colombia, the centre of the world's cocaine trade, has endured civil war for decades between left-wing rebels with roots in the peasant majority and right-wing paramilitaries with links to Spanish colonial landowners.
· Manuel 'Sureshot' Marulanda named his guerrilla band the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in 1966.
· Farc is thought to have about 800 hostages. The most high-profile is Ingrid Betancourt, 45, held since 2002.
· Every Farc member takes a vow to fight for 'social justice' in Colombia.
· About a third of Farc guerrillas are thought to be women.
· Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez is pushing for 'Bolivarian socialism', while Colombian President Alvaro Uribe is a free-market conservative.

Legitimidad a cambio de rehenes maltratados
TRIBUNA: JOAQUÍN VILLALOBOS
16/01/2008

Cuando comencé a conocer el conflicto colombiano me costó creer que los jefes de las FARC viajaban en vehículos con aire acondicionado y que sus campamentos tenían muchas comodidades; igual me sorprendió el evidente sobrepeso de algunos de sus comandantes. La guerra civil salvadoreña se explicaba por el exceso de poder del Estado, contrariamente, el conflicto colombiano se explica esencialmente por la debilidad del Estado en el control de su propio territorio. Colombia tiene lugares donde no hubo gobierno durante más de 40 años. Este vacío lo llenaron paramilitares, guerrilleros, narcotraficantes y bandidos que se convertían automáticamente en autoridad, bajo la indiferencia o anuencia de los gobiernos.

Los guerrilleros salvadoreños disputamos en combate cada metro cuadrado de nuestro pequeño país a gobiernos autoritarios sostenidos militarmente por los Estados Unidos. En Colombia, por el contrario, las FARC han sido una guerrilla sedentaria, que sin combatir mucho controló extensos territorios en los que no había gobierno. Por ello llevan 43 años en el monte y algunos de sus jefes han muerto de viejos. Sin embargo, en la misma Colombia, el Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) fue la primera guerrilla latinoamericana que, a costa de muchos muertos, negoció reformas políticas democráticas. Ahora el M-19, como parte del Polo Democrático, es la segunda fuerza del país. Es decir, que en Colombia la izquierda podría ganar las próximas elecciones, como ya ocurrió en Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brasil, Perú, Panamá, República Dominicana, Venezuela, Guatemala y Nicaragua.

Hay quienes continúan viendo a Latinoamérica como repúblicas bananeras en las que la violencia política es legítima. El mapa, los tiempos y el dinero de la cocaína coinciden con el crecimiento de la violencia de las FARC en los 90. Antes de eso eran una insurgencia perezosa, y por lo tanto poco relevante. En 1990, al morir su líder político Jacobo Arenas, las FARC se quedaron sin contención ideológica frente a los cultivos de coca que proliferaban en sus territorios. Comenzaron extorsionando narcotraficantes y terminaron de dueños de la mayor producción de cocaína del mundo. Transitaron de última guerrilla política latinoamericana a primer ejército irregular del narcotráfico, convirtiéndose en un reto real para el Estado colombiano.

Los gobiernos de los últimos 20 años tuvieron que comenzar a revertir la debilidad del Estado y a corregir abusos pasados. Primero acordaron la paz con las insurgencias políticas, luego desarticularon a los grandes carteles de narcotraficantes que dirigía Pablo Escobar, seguidamente un Gobierno bogotano inventó formas exitosas de combatir la cultura de violencia, y finalmente iniciaron la recuperación del campo. Propusieron negociaciones a las FARC que fracasaron debido al secuestro de doce parlamentarios que fueron ejecutados en junio de 2007. La fuerza del Ejército y la Policía crecieron y se desplegaron de forma permanente en los 1.120 municipios de Colombia. Los paramilitares empezaron a ser combatidos y desmovilizados. Los jefes guerrilleros perdieron sus vehículos con aire acondicionado y sus campamentos con refrigeradora. Acorralados, incurrieron en el terrorismo. Ciento diecisiete pobladores murieron refugiados en la iglesia de Bellavista cuando ésta fue destruida por las FARC; un coche bomba con 200 kilos de explosivos demolió un club bogotano lleno de familias; esto se volvió cotidiano, y los civiles muertos y heridos sumaron miles. Sin embargo, ahora la violencia de las FARC es decadente y en el 2007 no pudieron realizar una sola toma u hostigamiento a los poblados que controla el Estado. Sus combatientes se desmovilizan masiva y voluntariamente, 2.400 sólo el año pasado, y hay evidencia pública de que algunos jefes guerrilleros han recuperado las comodidades perdidas en el territorio venezolano.

Las FARC no tienen futuro como guerrilla, aunque lo tengan como narcotraficantes. La inmensa selva colombiana les facilita mantener a los rehenes que secuestraron en el pasado y usarlos cómo su último cartucho político. Las duras condiciones en que mantienen a éstos evidencian desmoralización y pérdida de control; ni siquiera sabían dónde estaba el niño Emmanuel. Las FARC hicieron del secuestro, la extorsión y el narcotráfico sus principales actividades, son los mayores secuestradores del planeta. Una insurgencia negocia a partir de la legitimidad política de sus demandas o de la fuerza militar que detenta, pero exigir legitimidad a cambio de rehenes maltratados y amenazados de morir, equivale a pedir respeto por ser malvado. El anti-neoliberalismo no justifica explotar el dolor de las familias de los rehenes. Si Chávez estuviera sólo ayudando a salvar rehenes sería positivo, pero su reconocimiento político a las FARC, reaviva la violencia colombiana, le abre las puertas de su país a la cocaína y lo convierte en protector de unos crueles narcoterroristas.

Tomado de El Pais,
Joaquín Villalobos, quién fuera uno de los máximos líderes de las guerrillas Salvadoreñas en los años 80 y 90.

La muestra de Colombia
Por Teódulo López Meléndez
Enero 2008
Diciembre ha pasado a tener dos características: el mes en que Chávez hace de las suyas y el mes en que la oposición desaparece. Ya vamos por tres semanas en que los opositores no abren la boca y en que el presidente la ha abierto en demasía. Hemos asistido a todo tipo de locuras, desde el espectáculo del flamante canciller pidiendo una prueba de ADN como si se tratase de un niño venezolano o de un hijo de madre venezolana hasta el estúpido de Insulza ofreciendo a la OEA como árbitro genético; desde un cambio de gabinete absolutamente intrascendente motivado –válgame Dios- porque el Jefe del Estado se ha dado cuenta de que su gobierno no se ocupa de los problemas de la gente hasta una demostración colombiana de coherencia.

Es en la nota optimista donde me quiero detener, por aquello de que año nuevo implica resaltar lo positivo. Todo este drama ha tenido, a mi entender, una consecuencia impensada y consiste en que los venezolanos hemos podido mirar a Colombia como nunca. Hemos asistido a la visión de un gobierno absolutamente coherente, con separación de poderes y donde las instituciones funcionan hasta una comprobación –que le hace mucho bien a Venezuela- del drama colombiano. En efecto, hemos verificado como funciona en el país vecino el Instituto de Bienestar Familiar (caso Emmanuel), como la Fiscalía es meticulosa en sus procederes, como sus ministros son gente seria, como es el drama de las FARC (me ahorro los adjetivos porque los venezolanos y el mundo entero ya se los han puesto) y como es el pueblo colombiano, hasta por el detalle de los familiares de los secuestrados que han estado en Caracas.

No pretendo inmiscuirme en la política interna colombiana, pero la comparación entre los dos países ha sido muy dañina para este gobierno que los venezolanos padecemos. Comparemos ambas Fiscalías Generales, comparemos ambas instituciones que protegen a los niños en estado de abandono, comparemos la seriedad de los ministros de ambos países y lleguemos a una conclusión obvia: con todo el respeto para quienes adversan al presidente Uribe la Venezuela actual no admite comparación con la Colombia actual. Colombia se muestra como un país mientras Venezuela se muestra como un campamento. El resultado se nota en cualquier parte donde uno puede escuchar los comentarios de la gente: ha aumentado el afecto por los colombianos, los venezolanos han entendido perfectamente que cosa es la FARC y hasta se ha desarrollado un cierto grado de envidia por la manera en que funcionan las instituciones del vecino país.

Repito que este no es un texto en defensa de Uribe (que da todas las sensaciones de saber defenderse solo), sino más bien un texto de admisión de realidades. Venezuela se ha deteriorado en todos los aspectos hasta el límite de la infamia y la comparación de estos días con Colombia ha sido provechosa. La gente se ha dado cuenta de que estamos muy mal gracias a un episodio dramático. Sería interesante que los hermanos colombianos entendiesen en toda su magnitud este fenómeno que se ha producido, pues abre puertas a granel y establece las bases para una relación más estrecha y fecunda cuando los venezolanos salgamos de esta pesadilla.

Quizás lo de las FARC hay que resaltarlo, pues invita a comparaciones. ¿Eso de que Uribe tenía secuestrado a Emmanuel no les suena a frases como que la oposición venezolana paga a sicarios para matar taxistas y así provocarlos a que tranquen calles? En contrapartida la oposición democrática colombiana ha sido respetuosa y mesurada en todo este episodio. ¿Eso de las FARC en sus comunicados no les suena a un ministro nuestro diciendo que Chávez utilizó bien la palabra “mierda” porque la utiliza el Coronel que no tenía quien le escribiera? ¿Esos comunicados de las FARC no se les asemejan a los dicterios de que los motines en nuestras cárceles son provocados por la oposición? ¿Esa falsificación permanente de la FARC de la realidad no les suena a la negativa constante e impúdica sobre las alarmante cifras de muertos por el hampa en este país nuestro? He aquí una de las consecuencias de todo este desaguisado que se salva con la bendita aparición de Emmanuel salvo y sano: las FARC y el gobierno venezolano hablan el mismo lenguaje, utilizan la mentira como arma predilecta, falsifican las realidades y convierten el desparpajo engañoso en la norma.

La lección de Colombia en estos días de tránsito de un año a otro ha sido espectacular. Hemos visto a un país con cinco décadas de violencia que aún así es capaz de ser un país. Uno donde los funcionarios se cuidan, como en el caso de pedir a un laboratorio europeo una prueba adicional de ADN a pesar de tener conciencia de que la hecha en Colombia es definitiva y que estamos ante la presencia de Emmanuel Rojas. La otra arma fundamental para que ahora tengamos una plataforma de futuro colombo-venezolana realmente excepcional, y que deberemos aprovechar en aras de la integración, ha sido la presencia en Caracas de las familias de dos de los secuestrados. Doña Clara González de Rojas ha hecho más que todo un esfuerzo diplomático. Su serenidad, su talante, su dignidad y su equilibrio nos han mostrado a un pueblo. Esa chica Patricia Perdomo – hija de la exparlamentaria secuestrada- con una sonrisa siempre a flor de labios, sin perder el optimismo, sin emitir una queja, sin incurrir en la menor crítica de tipo político, ha sido todo un ejemplo de compostura y de reciedumbre.

Hemos visto a Colombia. Ese ha sido el regalo que nos ha dejado el 2007 y que continúa dándonos el 2008.

Tomado de: A traves de Venezuela
http://www.atravesdevenezuela.com/html/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=10116

The Washignton Post
Editorials
Wednesday, January 16, 2008; Page A14
Ally to Kidnappers
Venezuela's Hugo Chávez endorses Colombian groups known for abductions, drug trafficking and mass murder.

ON THURSDAY, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an organization that in the past decade has kidnapped more than 750 people who remain missing, released two captives into the custody of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. The FARC, which decades ago discarded the Marxist ideology it wielded in the 1960s for the mercenary causes of abduction and drug trafficking, is anything but an altruistic movement, so many wondered what it would get in exchange for the propaganda coup it handed Mr. Chávez.

The shocking answer arrived the next day: In a four-hour address to the Venezuelan Congress, Mr. Chávez described the FARC and another Colombian group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), as "not terrorists" but "genuine armies." He claimed that they possessed "a Bolivarian political project that is respected here," a reference to his own, half-baked "socialism for the 21st century." And he demanded that they be recognized as lawful belligerents by the United States and Latin American and European governments that now classify them as terrorist organizations. In short, Mr. Chávez was endorsing groups dedicated to violence and other criminal behavior in a neighboring Latin American democracy, and associating his agenda with theirs.

It was encouraging to see the revulsion this statement instantly produced in Latin America, where terrorism has caused incalculable damage. But the message the FARC channeled through Mr. Chávez was really aimed at Europeans and Americans. Some in Washington, London and Madrid, where kidnappings are rare, are happy to embrace Mr. Chávez -- former congressman Joseph P. Kennedy II, for example, can be heard in radio advertisements touting his alliance with the Venezuelan leader. The FARC may think it can similarly find allies. Filmmaker Oliver Stone is already sold: He recently called the FARC "heroic."

The answer to this logic was provided by the press office of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, who has been waging what is, in fact, a heroic battle against the brutal gangs that for decades have plagued his country. "The violent groups of Colombia are terrorists because they finance themselves through a business that is lethal to humanity: drug trafficking," the press office said. (The FARC exports hundreds of tons of cocaine annually, and an increasing portion of it passes through Venezuela.) "The violent groups of Colombia are terrorists because they kidnap, place bombs indiscriminately, recruit and murder children, murder pregnant women, murder the elderly and use antipersonnel mines that leave in their wake thousands of innocent victims." All these assertions have been well documented by Western human rights groups that are otherwise hostile to Mr. Uribe's government.

No wonder even governments allied with Mr. Chávez, such as those of Argentina and Ecuador, recoiled from his appeal. Latin American leaders who until now have seen in Mr. Chávez a crude populist who buys his friends with petrodollars are faced with something new: a head of state who has openly endorsed an organization of kidnappers and drug traffickers in a neighboring, democratic country. "You can't be legal in your own country and accept illegality in another," said Guatemala's newly elected president, Álvaro Colom. Venezuela's neighbors now must calculate how to respond to a leader who has violated that fundamental rule.

ANÁLISIS: Los cautivos de las FARC EL OBSERVADOR GLOBAL
Colombia y el síndrome de Copenhague
Moisés Naím

El asalto al banco no salió bien. Los ladrones que, en 1973, intentaron atracar el Kreditbanken de Estocolmo quedaron atrapados en el banco y tomaron como rehenes a varios empleados. La sorpresa no fue que los criminales tardasen seis días en entregarse; fue que los rehenes se hicieron amigos de sus secuestradores. El episodio dio origen al llamado síndrome de Estocolmo: un extraño proceso psicológico mediante el cual los secuestrados a veces desarrollan vínculos de solidaridad y simpatía con sus captores.

El caso de Colombia, país que es víctima de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC), ilustra una patética variante del síndrome de Estocolmo. No se trata de que los colombianos simpaticen con las FARC, ya que el grupo armado que les hace sufrir desde 1964 es detestado por una abrumadora mayoría de la población. Se trata de la globalización del síndrome de Estocolmo: son los extranjeros, muchos de ellos en lejanos continentes, quienes sufren de un extraño proceso que les lleva a simpatizar con asesinos y secuestradores.

En Dinamarca, por ejemplo, una organización llamada Fighters+Lovers vende camisetas con el símbolo de las FARC y promete donarles parte de sus ventas. Debido a que las FARC es uno de los grupos terroristas que la Unión Europea prohíbe financiar, el Gobierno danés entabló un juicio contra los vendedores de camisetas. Y lo perdió. Los jueces de Copenhague no creen que las FARC sea una organización que aterroriza a un país entero. Según esta lógica, al no ser las FARC un grupo terrorista, los daneses que les envían dinero no cometen crimen alguno.

De esta manera, ahora al síndrome de Estocolmo podemos añadir el síndrome de Copenhague: el raro proceso mediante el cual la ideología y la politiquería se mezclan con la ingenuidad y la ignorancia para justificar crímenes de lesa humanidad, siempre y cuando no sucedan en el país de los afectados por el síndrome.

Es fácil imaginar que los civilizados jueces de Copenhague hubiesen llegado a una opinión muy diferente si las víctimas de las FARC fuesen daneses en lugar de colombianos. Basta averiguar un poco y con algo de honestidad para descubrir que las motivaciones ideológicas que alguna vez tuvieron las FARC ya no existen. Hoy en día la retórica que iguala a las FARC con los movimientos de liberación nacional sólo sirve para ocultar el hecho de que se han convertido en una cruel fuerza mercenaria del narcotráfico.

Pero el síndrome de Copenhague no solo afecta a los jueces daneses. Hace poco, tres congresistas estadounidenses le escribieron una amable carta a Manuel Marulanda Vélez, Tirofijo -el jefe de las FARC-, para expresar su complacencia por haberse dignado las FARC a ofrecer vídeos, por primera vez en siete años, que confirmaban que aún no habían asesinado a Ingrid Betancourt y otros secuestrados. "Fue un paso en la dirección correcta y quisimos mostrar nuestro aprecio", dijo Gregory Meeks, uno de los congresistas firmantes de la carta.

Otro estadounidense, el cineasta Oliver Stone, tampoco tiene dudas sobre quién es quién en esta tragedia: "Uribe miente, y debe asumir su responsabilidad ante el mundo", dijo, refiriéndose al presidente colombiano. Para Stone, las FARC resultan más creíbles que el presidente democráticamente electo de Colombia. Ésta es una convicción que comparte con el presidente de Venezuela: "Yo acuso al presidente de Colombia de estar mintiendo... y haber dinamitado el proceso de canje humanitario", dijo Hugo Chávez al expresar su frustración ante el hecho de que Clara Rojas y su hijo Emmanuel, así como Consuelo González, no fuesen liberados antes de finalizar el año. ¿La explicación? Según ellos, el Ejército colombiano llevó a cabo intensos operativos contra las FARC en las zonas donde se efectuaría el canje. Esto lo ha negado el presidente Uribe, recordando no sólo el largo historial de mentiras y promesas incumplidas por la FARC, sino anunciando que las FARC no podían liberar a los rehenes, puesto que uno de ellos, el niño Emmanuel, había sido entregado a una organización de protección social.

Lo difícil de explicar para Stone, Chávez y otros críticos del presidente Uribe, es por qué les resulta tan difícil a las FARC liberar a los rehenes si esto es algo que saben hacer muy bien: llevan décadas haciéndolo de manera rutinaria, una vez que reciben los pagos que compran la libertad de sus inocentes víctimas. La negociación y la eventual liberación de rehenes es un proceso frecuente, secreto y misterioso. En miles de transacciones previas nunca antes las FARC habían necesitado helicópteros venezolanos, la presencia de observadores internacionales y de centenares de periodistas.

Detrás de todo esto no hay sino la cruel e inhumana explotación del síndrome de Copenhague por parte de las FARC y sus facilitadores. Mientras que el síndrome de Estocolmo se produce por razones psicológicas, el de Copenhague es causado por cálculos políticos muy crudos, donde las excusas humanitarias no son sino eso: excusas para actuar de la manera más políticamente conveniente pero más hipócritamente inhumana.


Por eso, quienes simpatizan con las FARC deben exigir que se libere a todos los rehenes, tanto a los pocos ya famosos como a los muchos aún anónimos. Eso es algo que las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas saben hacer y pueden hacer si quieren. Ahora mismo. Sin circo. Y sin payasos.

mnaim@elpais.es

Tomado de Moisés Naím, de El País de España
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Colombia/sindrome/Copenhague/elpepiint/20080106elpepiint_2/Tes#%3Fctn%3DvotosC%26aP%3Dmodulo%253DEVN%2526params%253Did%25253D20080106elpepiint_2.Tes%252526fp%25253D20080106%252526to%25253Dnoticia%252526te%25253D%252526a%25253D5%252526ov%25253D574

Chávez pierde, gana Uribe
José Vales
El Universal -- Mexico

El mandatario colombiano ha mostrado que nadie mejor que él sabe lo que sucede en su país

BUENOS AIRES.— “Las altas probabilidades” de que Juan David sea Emmanuel reavivaron ayer la tensión entre dos gobiernos, el colombiano y el venezolano.
Es notorio observar cómo el proceso de confirmación de la identidad del hijo de Clara Rojas puede poner en vilo a todo un gobierno. Hasta aquí, y hasta que lleguen las contrapruebas a realizarse en España, el poder de Emmanuel parece lanzar un veredicto a favor de la tesis esgrimida por la administración de Álvaro Uribe el último día de 2007.

La reacción del canciller venezolano, Nicolás Maduro, acusando a Colombia de no permitir a técnicos venezolanos tomar otra prueba de ADN al menor, es la muestra palpable de lo incómodo, por no decir descolocado, que quedó el presidente Hugo Chávez, quien prefirió abocarse a la conformación de un nuevo gabinete y a limitarse a decir que la “Operación Emmanuel” seguirá adelante “en otra fase”, sin aclarar si era la de otra excursión con Néstor Kirchner y Oliver Stone a la selva colombiana, o tal vez a los llanos venezolanos esta vez, o al bautismo de Emmanuel una vez esté a la guarda de su familia.

De hecho, Iván Rojas, hermano de la cautiva ex candidata a la presidencia, dijo estar “seguro” de que el niño ubicado en el Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar es su sobrino y de paso pidió la liberación de Clara “para que puedan hacerse el ADN”.

Chávez ha quedado golpeado y los Kirchner, que habían decidido participar del fiasco de Villavicencio para atemperar los efectos de la maleta de dólares venezolanos que se ventila en los tribunales de Miami, no le van a la zaga.

El ex presidente argentino que siempre desdeñó las relaciones internacionales y que lo desconoce todo de Colombia (era la primera vez que la pisaba) pecó de bisoño e inexperto. La pareja presidencial se quedó sin la foto con los rehenes liberados que hubiera ayudado en este complicado debut de gestión (la de Cristina Fernández) y contra los cacerolazos que sonaron en los últimos días contra los cortes de energía.

Por lo pronto, Álvaro Uribe aparece relegitimado internacionalmente, siempre que en los días sucesivos no aparezca nada ni nadie que ponga en duda lo que Luis Carlos Restrepo, el alto comisionado para la Paz, llamó como “un caso humanitario”. La política puede dar para todo.

Hasta aquí, Uribe le gana la pulseada a Chávez y, lo que en su microclima es más importante, a las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), afectadas políticamente después que habían logrado rehacerse —gracias a la necesidad del canje humanitario y al propio Chávez— en ese terreno, por primera vez desde el fin de las conversaciones de paz en 2002.

Con estos resultados, que afectan incluso hasta los cautos gobiernos de Brasil, Bolivia y Ecuador, Uribe ratifica que el centro del escenario político colombiano es suyo sin ambages, mientras Chávez y los países garantes de una liberación que no fue tratan de canalizar el golpe al que los sometió la identidad de Emmanuel.

Sábado 05 de enero de 2008
Tomado de José Vales -- El Universal -- Mexico
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/56505.html

Chavez Down, Not Out
by John R. Thomson *
It has not been a happy few weeks for Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez. First, he was roundly chastised by the King of Spain in front of his Latin American peers and, later, the world. A few days later, the red-shirted dictator was dealt a major verbal blow by his Colombian counterpart, Alvaro Uribe.

Then, most embarrassing of all, his countrymen defeated Chavez' proposed constitutional changes, which he had assured one and all, would be overwhelmingly approved. And the defeat was not by the purported slimmest of margins, 50.7 percent, as announced by Venezuela's electoral commission: highly reliable sources put the opposition's majority at 53, perhaps as high as 55, percent. Of course, we will never know the actual vote, as the commission has the ability to change the automatic voting machine tallies at will.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela George Landau notes, "Venezuelans, even the poor, do not want a Cuban-Communist regime. What killed Chavez were the abstentions of his own people … unhappy that, while they live in misery, Chavez subsidizes vast parts of the world, even including the Bronx…. Food shortages were a big reason for massive abstentions. Student involvement was a major factor that goes back to Chavez closing the popular RC-TV, his biggest mistake so far because people realized he was an absolute dictator."

And there were numerous other reasons, not the least the turning against Chavez of longtime ally and former Defense Minister Raul Baduel. Capping his personal campaign to vote "No", Baduel essentially told Venezuelans the day before the referendum to defeat the referendum and his former army colleagues to let the results stand. Among other once close Chavez confidants, it was even reported his hand-picked President of the Supreme Court, Luisa Estella Morales Lamuño, voted "No".

Although Hugo Chavez controlled virtually all government forces, much of the media remained opposed, as did the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Perhaps most telling, Chavez lost the support of much of his longtime power base, the poor. Some 44% abstained, a sharp reversal from 2006 when he gained a crushing re-election victory.

Indeed, one former senior government official cited "the unusual and undocumented growth of the official voting roles during the last few years, which increased from less than 11 million voters to more than 16 million … and this still couldn't save the day.

"With scarcity of basic staple products like milk, eggs and rice, plus a rising personal insecurity crisis, citizens felt abandoned by a government which has not fulfilled its promises, even more unacceptable when the country is earning the highest petroleum income ever.

"Venezuelans had enough moral reserves to reject a totalitarian proposal intended to convert the country into yet another socialist fiasco," he concluded. "The Chavez revolution has been fatally trapped in its own rhetoric."

In less than three weeks, three stinging reversals, but unfortunately, the contest in question is not baseball, Venezuela's favorite sport. It is deadly serious politics -- not only domestic, but regional – and Hugo Chavez cannot be counted out.

The former army colonel is a survivor. In the 1992 failed coup attempt, he was the only one of six rebel officers who failed to obtain his objective [instead of capturing Miraflores, the presidential palace, Chavez took shelter in a nearby military museum during the fighting] leading to the coup's failure. Nevertheless, following capture and conviction, he received a pardon and was free to mount his successful 1998 bid for the presidency.

Chavez has committed to effect the changes he needs to achieve one man rule and dictate as long as he wishes; moreover, he remains fully committed to strengthen and extend his Bolivarian Revolution throughout Latin America.

With five countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela – effectively within his orbit, the next targets are Peru and Colombia. Fortunately, Peru has been supported by the recently approved free trade agreement with the United States.

Colombia is more gravely threatened for two reasons: proximity to Venezuela and Congressional opposition to its own free trade pact. Bowing to opposition by the AFL-CIO, purportedly because of "human rights concerns", Democratic congressional leadership has so far refused to schedule a vote for the agreement, playing directly into Chavez' and Colombian leftists' claims that Washington is no friend of Colombia.

Almost since coming to power, Chavez has curried relations with FARC, the murderous Colombian communist guerilla and narcotics trafficking organization. FARC troops maintain bases in the Venezuelan jungle bordering Colombia and their leaders have safe haven homes in Caracas [FARC "Foreign Minister" Rodrigo Granda carries Venezuelan identification and is a registered voter].

Chavez functionaries have developed a plan to give some two million permanent resident visas to Colombian illegal immigrants in return for voting their way in 2010, and Venezuelan medical vans, manned by Cuban doctors, offer free care to Colombians across the border.

In addition, the would-be Venezuelan president-for-life has close relations with leaders of Colombia's far left Polo Democratico party, which finished second in last year's presidential elections and in October elected it second successive mayor of the country's capital, Bogota.

Chavez has boasted of spending as much five billion dollars – more if necessary – to have his favored candidate win Colombian presidential elections in 2010, and everything suggests that between his FARC and Polo Democratico allies he has a powerful supporting infrastructure.

President Alvao Uribe has waged an all-out war on narcotics and terrorism – even sending specialist army troops to aid in Afghanistan's war on drugs – ranking his government as the United States' closest Latin American ally. Failure to approve the U.S.-Colombian free trade agreement will hurt democracy gravely, not just in Colombia but throughout the entire region.

Hugo Chavez has declared war, but not between imperialism and revolution, as he claims. The fight is between democracy and autocracy, between civil liberty and militarism, between the free market and socialism.

The people of Venezuela clearly understood and rejected the Chavez alternative on December 2. It is up to freedom's friends to do everything possible to roll his Bolivarian Revolution into the dustbin of history.

* John R. Thomson is an international businessman and former diplomat and writes frequently on developing world issues. He welcomes comments at Thomson.john.r@gmail.com

Source: Washington Times

12/06/2007
Philosopher, poet and friend
Jürgen Habermas writes an obiturary for American philosopher Richard Rorty
The American philosopher Richard Rorty passed away on Friday. Rorty, whose work ranges over an unusually broad intellectual terrain, was the author of many works, including "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (1979), "Consequences of Pragmatism" (1982), and "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" (1989).

I received the news in an email almost exactly a year ago. As so often in recent years, Rorty voiced his resignation at the "war president" Bush, whose policies deeply aggrieved him, the patriot who had always sought to "achieve" his country. After three or four paragraphs of sarcastic analysis came the unexpected sentence: " Alas, I have come down with the same disease that killed Derrida." As if to attenuate es much to the unforgettable rhetorical skill and flawless prose of a writer who was always ready to shock readers with unaccustomed strategies of representation, unexpected oppositional concepts and new vocabularies - one of Rorty's favourite terms. Rorty's talent as an essayist spanned the range from Friedrich Schlegel to Surrealism.

The irony and passion, the playful and polemical tone of an intellectual who revolutionised our modes of thinking and influenced people throughout the world point to a robust temperament. But this impression doesn't do justice to the gentle nature of a man who was often shy and withdrawn - and always sensitive to others.

One small autobiographical piece by Rorty bears the title 'Wild Orchids and Trotsky.' In it, Rorty describes how as a youth he ambled around the blooming hillside in north-west New Jersey, and breathed in the stunning odour of the orchids. Around the same time he discovered a fascinating book at the home of his leftist parents, defending Leon Trotsky against Stalin. This was the origin of the vision that the young Rorty took with him to college: philosophy is there to reconcile the celestial beauty of orchids with Trotsky's dream of justice on earth. Nothing is sacred to Rorty the ironist. Asked at the end of his life about the "holy", the strict atheist answered with words reminiscent of the young Hegel: "My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that some day my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law."

*

The article originally appeared in German in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on June 11, 2007.

Jürgen Habermas, born in 1929, is one of Germany's foremost intellectual figures. A philosopher and sociologist, he is professor emeritus at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt and the leading representative of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. His works include "Legitimation Crisis", "Knowledge and Human Interests", "Theory of Communicative Action" and "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity."

Translation: jab.
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How to Lose an Ally
By Robert Novak


Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe returned to Bogota this week in a state of
shock. His three-day visit to Capitol Hill in Washington to win over
Democrats in Congress was described by one American supporter as
"catastrophic." Colombian sources said Uribe was stunned by the ferocity of
his Democratic opponents, and Vice President Francisco Santos publicly
talked about cutting U.S.-Colombian ties.

Uribe got nothing from his meeting with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other
Democratic leaders. Military aid remains stalled, overall assistance is
reduced, and the vital U.S.-Colombian trade bill looks dead. The first
Colombian president to crack down on his country's corrupt army officer
hierarchy, and to assault both right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing
guerrillas, last week confronted Democrats wedded to out-of-date claims of
civil rights abuses and to rigidly protectionist dogma.

This is remarkable U.S. treatment for a rare friend on the South American
continent, where Venezuela's leftist dictator Hugo Chavez can only exult in
Uribe's embarrassment as he builds an anti-American bloc of nations. A
former congressional staffer, who in 1999 helped author Plan Colombia
against narco-guerrillas, told me: "President Uribe may be the odd man out,
and that's no way to treat our best ally in South America."

Uribe has not given up on the Yankees. When he returned to Colombia, he
issued boilerplate about his visit being "very important in opening a
dialogue with American leaders." This week he publicly urged the sluggish
army to "rescue the hostages" held by narco-guerrillas and "go after the
ringleaders," while privately chewing out the generals for inactivity. At
the same time, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, whose Foreign
Service career includes Latin American duty, was in Bogota Tuesday insisting
that the United States remains a great friend of Colombia.

A truer portent of the Colombian reaction to the rebuff in Washington last
week was Vice President Santos's television interview Tuesday. Santos, a
University of Texas graduate and former editor of the influential El Tiempo
newspaper, said failure to ratify the free-trade agreement would "send a
message to the external enemies of the United States" (meaning Venezuela's
Chavez) that "this is how America treats its allies." He added that Colombia
might "have to re-evaluate its relationship with the United States." A U.S.
diplomat called that "a cream pie in the face" of the visiting Negroponte.

Hopes that the Democratic majority in Congress might perceive the importance
of supporting Colombia were dashed April 20 when Al Gore canceled a joint
appearance with Uribe at an environmental event in Miami. Gore cited
allegations of Uribe's association with paramilitary forces a decade ago,
charges denied by the Colombian president.

Gore's snub legitimized what the new congressional majority is intent on
doing anyway. Democrats follow both left-wing human rights lobbyists and
AFL-CIO President John Sweeney's protectionist campaign against the
Colombian free-trade agreement. Rep. Sander Levin, chairman of the Ways and
Means subcommittee on trade, as usual echoes labor's line against the bill.

In the wake of Uribe's visit to Washington, two prominent House Republicans
-- former Speaker J. Dennis Hastert and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, ranking
minority member of the Foreign Affairs Committee -- made a quick trip to
Colombia. Visiting there for the first time in many years, they were struck
by the progress. They met with Colombian national police who had just
returned from Afghanistan, where they advised NATO forces in techniques for
dealing with narco-terrorists.

Democrats in Congress seem oblivious to such help or such progress. Sen.
Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee dealing with
foreign aid, last month held up $55.2 million in military aid to Colombia
because of "human rights" concerns. While Pelosi and her colleagues could
not find a kind word for Uribe, Leahy insisted that he "supports" the
Colombian president. As Lenin once put it, he supports him as a rope
supports a hanged man.

President George W. Bush at least gave lip service to Uribe last week, but
his concentration is on Iraq as the U.S. position in its own backyard
deteriorates. Passivity is the best description of the administration's
posture, while Democrats follow human rights activists, environmentalists
and labor leaders on the road to losing an important ally.

CARTA DE FERNANDO VALLEJO

"A México llegué el 25 de febrero de 1971, vale decir hace 36 años largos, más de la mitad de mi vida, a los que hay que sumarles un año que viví antes en Nueva York. ¿Y por qué no estaba en Colombia durante todo ese tiempo? Porque Colombia me cerró las puertas para que me ganara la vida de una forma decente que no fuera en el gobierno ni en la política a los que desprecio y me puso a dormir en la calle tapándome con periódicos y junto a los desarrapados de la Carrera Séptima y a los perros abandonados, que desde entonces considero mis hermanos. Me fui a Nueva York a tratar de hacer cine, que es lo que había estudiado, y de allá me vine a México y en pocos años conseguí que Conacite 2, una de las tres compañías cinematográficas del Estado mexicano, me financiara mi primera película, Crónica Roja, de tema colombiano. Entonces regresé a Bogotá a tratar de filmarla con el dinero mexicano.

¡Imposible! Ahí estaba el Incomex para impedirme importar el negativo y los equipos; la Dirección de Tránsito para no darme los permisos que necesitaba para filmar en las calles; el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores para no darme las visas de los técnicos que tenía que traer de México; la Policía para no darme su protección durante el rodaje y el permiso de que mis actores usaran uniformes como los suyos y pistolas de utilería pues había policías en mi historia...

Y así, un largo etcétera de cuando menos veinte dependencias burocráticas con que tuve que tratar y que lo más que me dieron fue un tinto después de ponerme a hacer antesalas durante horas.

Entonces resolví filmarla en México reconstruyendo a Colombia. En Jalapa, la capital del Estado de Veracruz, por ejemplo, encontré calles que se parecían a las de los barrios de Belén y de la Candelaria de Bogotá y allí filmé algunas secuencias. Con actores y técnicos mexicanos, con dinero mexicano e infinidad de tropiezos, logré hacer en México mi película colombiana a la que Colombia se oponía, soñando que la iban a ver mis paisanos en los teatros colombianos.

¿Saben entonces qué pasó? Que mi mezquina patria la prohibió aduciendo que era una apología al delito. Una apología al delito que se basaba en hechos reales que en su momento la opinión pública conoció y que salió en todos los periódicos, la del final de los dos hermanos Barragán, unos muchachitos a los que la policía masacró en un barrio del sur de Bogotá.

A cuantas instancias burocráticas apelé, empezando por la Junta de Censura y acabando en el Consejo de Estado, la prohibieron. Nadie en Colombia, ni una sola persona, levantó su voz para protestar por el atropello, que no era sólo a mí sino al sueño de todos los cineastas colombianos, quienes por lo demás, sea dicho de paso, también guardaron silencio.

Como yo soy muy terco volví a repetir el intento con mi segunda película colombiana, En la tormenta, sobre el enfrentamiento criminal entre conservadores y liberales en el campo cuando la época llamada de la Violencia con mayúscula, y con igual resultado: no me la dejaron filmar, la tuve que hacer en México y me la prohibieron, aduciendo que el momento era muy delicado para permitir una película así.

Como yo sólo quería hacer cine colombiano y no mexicano, ni italiano, ni japonés, ni marciano, desistí del intento. En alguno de mis libros, aunque ya no me acuerdo en cuál, conté todo esto pero con más detalle: los camiones de escalera y los pueblitos colombianos que tuve que construir, los platanares y cafetales que tuve que sembrar en las afueras de la Ciudad de México, los ríos quietos como el Papaloapan que tuve que mover para que arrastraran los cadáveres de los asesinados con la ira del río Cauca, la utilería que tuve que mandar a hacer o traer de Colombia a México, como las placas de los carros y las botellas de cerveza... Nunca acabaría de contar esas cosas.

Lo resumo en una sola frase: Colombia, la mala patria que me cupo en suerte, acabó con mis sueños de cineasta.

Entonces me puse a escribir y durante diez años investigué, día tras día tras día, en un país o en otro o en otro, en bibliotecas y hemerotecas de muchos lados, sobre la vida de Barba Jacob, mi paisano, el poeta de Antioquia, que durante tantos años vivió en México y que aquí murió, y acabada mi investigación de diez años en uno más la escribí y me puse a buscar quién la editara.

Se acercaba el año 1983, el del centenario del nacimiento de Barba Jacob, y el Congreso colombiano se interesaba en ello. No creían lo que yo les contaba del poeta ni los años que llevaba siguiéndole sus huellas. Me pidieron que les mandara pruebas y les mandé entonces fotos e infinidad de documentos. Nada de eso me devolvieron, con todo se quedaron y el libro lo pensaban publicar en mimeógrafo. Les contesté que eso no sólo no era digno de Barba Jacob, un gran poeta, sino de ellos mismos, unos aprovechadores públicos que se designaban como el Honorable Congreso de la República. Que se respetaran.

Entonces publiqué mi biografía Barba Jacob el mensajero en México con dinero de amigos mexicanos. Cuantas veces me ha podido atropellar Colombia me ha atropellado. Hace un año me quería meter preso por un artículo que escribí en la revista Soho señalando las contradicciones y las ridiculeces de los Evangelios.

Eso dizque era un agravio a la religión y me demandaron. ¡Agravios a la religión en el país de la impunidad! En que los asesinos y genocidas andan libres por las calles, como es el caso de los paramilitares, con la bendición de su cómplice el sinvergüenza de Álvaro Uribe que han reelegido en la Presidencia.

Desde niño sabía que Colombia era un país asesino, el más asesino de la tierra, encabezando año tras año, imbatible, las estadísticas de la infamia.

Después, por experiencia propia, fui entendiendo que además de asesino era atropellador y mezquino. Y cuando reeligieron a Uribe descubrí que era un país imbécil.

Entonces solicité mi nacionalización en México, que me dieron la semana pasada. Así que quede claro: esa mala patria de Colombia ya no es la mía y no quiero volver a saber de ella.

Lo que me reste de vida lo quiero vivir en México y aquí me pienso morir".

washigton post
Assault on an Ally
Why are Democrats so 'deeply troubled' by Colombia's Álvaro Uribe?

Sunday, May 6, 2007; Page B06

COLOMBIAN President Álvaro Uribe may be the most popular democratic leader in the world. Last week, as he visited Washington, a poll showed his approval rating at 80.4 percent -- extraordinary for a politician who has been in office nearly five years. Colombians can easily explain this: Since his first election in 2002, Mr. Uribe has rescued their country from near-failed-state status, doubling the size of the army and extending the government's control to large areas that for decades were ruled by guerrillas and drug traffickers. The murder rate has dropped by nearly half and kidnappings by 75 percent. For the first time thugs guilty of massacres and other human rights crimes are being brought to justice, and the political system is being purged of their allies. With more secure conditions for investment, the free-market economy is booming.

In a region where populist demagogues are on the offensive, Mr. Uribe stands out as a defender of liberal democracy, not to mention a staunch ally of the United States. So it was remarkable to see the treatment that the Colombian president received in Washington. After a meeting with the Democratic congressional leadership, Mr. Uribe was publicly scolded by House Majority leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), whose statement made no mention of the "friendship" she recently offered Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Human Rights Watch, which has joined the Democratic campaign against Mr. Uribe, claimed that "today Colombia presents the worst human rights and humanitarian crisis in the Western hemisphere" -- never mind Venezuela or Cuba or Haiti. Former vice president Al Gore, who has advocated direct U.S. negotiations with the regimes of Kim Jong Il and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, recently canceled a meeting with Mr. Uribe because, Mr. Gore said, he found the Colombian's record "deeply troubling."

What could explain this backlash? Democrats claim to be concerned -- far more so than Colombians, apparently -- with "revelations" that the influence of right-wing paramilitary groups extended deep into the military and Congress. In fact this has been well-known for years; what's new is that investigations by Colombia's Supreme Court and attorney general have resulted in the jailing and prosecution of politicians and security officials. Many of those implicated come from Mr. Uribe's Conservative Party, and his former intelligence chief is under investigation. But the president himself has not been charged with wrongdoing. On the contrary: His initiative to demobilize 30,000 right-wing paramilitary fighters last year paved the way for the current investigations, which he and his government have supported and funded.

In fact, most of those who attack Mr. Uribe for the "parapolitics" affair have opposed him all along, and for very different reasons. Some, like Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), reflexively resist U.S. military aid to Latin America. Colombia has received more than $5 billion in economic and military aid from the Clinton and Bush administrations to fight drug traffickers and the guerrillas, and it hopes to receive $3.9 billion more in the next six years. Some, like Rep. Sander M. Levin (D-Mich.), are eager to torpedo Colombia's pending free-trade agreement with the United States. Now that the Bush administration has conceded almost everything that House Democrats asked for in order to pass pending trade deals, protectionist hard-liners have seized on the supposed human rights "crisis" as a pretext to blackball Colombia.

Perhaps Mr. Uribe is being punished by Democrats, too, because he has remained an ally of George W. Bush even as his neighbor, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, portrays the U.S. president as "the devil." Whatever the reasons, the Democratic campaign is badly misguided. If the Democrats succeed in wounding Mr. Uribe or thwarting his attempt to consolidate a democracy that builds its economy through free trade, the United States may have to live without any Latin American allies.

Entrevista al Canciller Fernando Araujo

Entrevista al Canciller Fernando Araujo

ENTREVISTA AL CANCILLER FERNANDO ARAÚJO PERDOMO EN RADIO SUPER

Bogotá, 6 mar (MRE). El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Fernando Araújo Perdomo, estuvo en La hora de la verdad, programa de Radio Super.

Radio Super, Fernando Londoño: Paloma Valencia quiere hacerle una pregunta, con su venia Canciller.

Paloma Valencia: Señor Canciller, si hay algo en lo que los colombianos nos regocijamos con su nombramiento, es el hecho de que la cara internacional de Colombia sea una persona que ha sufrido el flagelo del secuestro, que en mi opinión es el mayor mal que tiene esta sociedad, y en ese sentido le sorprende a uno que las familias de los secuestrados vayan a la comunidad internacional es a ponerle trabas al Gobierno, en vez de exigir que la guerrilla suspenda los actos de secuestro, irreductiblemente en el país. ¿Qué va a hacer usted en el tema del secuestro y cuáles son los planes de la Cancillería en este tema?

Canciller Fernando Araújo Perdomo: Yo les he venido insistiendo a los familiares de los secuestrados en la importancia de tener total y absoluta claridad de la responsabilidad política del secuestro. Ha habido un mensaje equívoco ante la comunidad nacional e internacional, en el sentido de trasladar la responsabilidad del secuestro al Gobierno, descargándola de las Farc. En la medida en que esa actitud se mantenga, las Farc van a pensar que están manteniendo un beneficio político del secuestro y van a poner todo tipo de trabas para que se den los acuerdos que permitan el regreso de los secuestrados a sus hogares.

He sostenido, que la política correcta es señalar claramente la responsabilidad de las Farc frente al tema del secuestro y exigirles de inmediato la liberación de todos los secuestrados, sin ningún tipo de contraprestación.

En la medida en que los familiares de los secuestrados, la ciudadanía, la sociedad civil, la comunidad internacional, señalemos claramente esa responsabilidad de las Farc, en esa medida vamos a lograr que las Farc comiencen a pagar un costo político y realmente sea insostenible para ellos mantener el negocio del secuestro y mantener la explotación política del secuestro como un tema principalísimo de su agenda.

ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY IN BOGOTÁ-COLOMBIA
THROUGH CIVIC CULTURE

This article presents the pedagogical strategy of change that the past city’s Mayors used in Bogotá to achieve a more sustainable city. Bogotá is a complex city: has more than seven million inhabitants that were not committed or interested in the city issues, financial resources are scare and always insufficient to solve the principal problems; local authorities were considered not reliable or accountable and citizens and industries did not obey the law. These barriers acted against any possibility of achieving sustainability, therefore the first step of the city was an strategy that reinforce local authorities, create breaking point situations, which interrupted the inertial movement of the citizens and the city; and establish and rebuild civic culture. These strategies helped sustainability. The paper presents the campaign to save water, the carrot party to reduce car accidents, traffic reduction that includes: Transmilenio (new public transportation system), clycloways (streets on Sunday are for pedestrians and bikes), bikeways, peak and plaque (restriction of car using by hours and plaque numbers), free car day and better walkways for pedestrians. It also addresses the way in which theater and mimes were use to change the behavior of pedestrians and drivers. All these cases show that the pedagogical effort to change behaviors were crucial to build a more sustainable city, that could change the way citizens related with the city. However, the effort is experimenting some failures because the lack of continuity of the cities new administration.

Otro Drácula que está en la búsqueda de más dinero


Chávez ayudó a Kirchner comprando $4,7 millardos en bonos (Reuters)




TRADUCCIÓN: SERVIO VILORIA, Publicado en El Universal, 12 de agosto de 2007

THE ECONOMIST

Las perspectivas económicas de Argentina parecen un tanto difíciles para el presidente Néstor Kirchner. El racionamiento de gas y electricidad es rutinario. Los inversionistas ya no confían en las cifras de la inflación y los mercados son presa del nerviosismo. Mientras que el rendimiento de los bonos brasileños subió 53 centésimas de un punto porcentual entre el 6 de julio y el 6 de agosto, el de los papeles argentinos aumentó 166 puntos.

No obstante, Kirchner parece tener un salvador, su homólogo venezolano Hugo Chávez, cuyo gobierno maneja petróleo y dinero de sobra. En su más reciente visita a Buenos Aires, Chávez ofreció comprar $500 millones en bonos (y otro tanto posteriormente). "Siempre ha estado allí cuando lo hemos necesitado", declaró Alberto Fernández, jefe de Gabinete del gobierno de Kirchner.

Esta relación es indignante para los argentinos que creen que su país se beneficiaría más si estrechara vínculos con EEUU y Europa, y para los venezolanos que ven cómo despilfarran su dinero. Sin embargo, esta alianza no es lo que parece: Kirchner obtiene ventajas políticas y el gobierno de Venezuela ganancias.

Todo comenzó hace más de tres años, cuando los dos países suscribieron un acuerdo mediante el cual Pdvsa se comprometía a venderle fuel oil a Argentina. Las ganancias, que hasta la fecha suman $560 millones, son depositadas en un fondo de inversiones que Venezuela utiliza para venderle productos derivados al Gobierno argentino. Después que Argentina decidió diversificar sus fuentes de financiamiento tras incumplir con el pago de su deuda en 2001, Chávez salió al rescate: le compró $4,7 millardos de dólares. Gracias a esta ayuda, "Argentina se está liberando de Drácula, está rompiendo las cadenas (que lo atan) al FMI", dijo Chávez.

Sin embargo, Chávez también hizo su agosto. Los bonos que acaba de comprar generan un interés de casi 11%. El Gobierno los vende a un precio con descuento a un grupo de bancos favorecidos. Además, Argentina ha pagado cerca de 20% más por el fuel oil que le compra a Pdvsa. Entretanto, el fondo de Pdvsa ha adjudicado jugosos contratos sin licitación a empresas argentinas bien conectadas.

La conspicua alianza no ha hecho nada para tranquilizar a los inversionistas extranjeros que son necesarios.